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ABSTRACT: In a recent survey, Frege (2002) concludes that economic analysis of 
the works council has reached a ‘dead end’. The present treatment offers a 
different conclusion based on a more encompassing review of the evidence. It will 
identify three distinct phases in the economic analysis of codetermination at the 
workplace. While Frege just considered studies from the first two phases, it is the 
third phase of research that contains some of the most positive evaluations to date 
of works council impact. Even if such estimates appear much exaggerated and the 
effect of works councils is likely to be small on average, the new literature redirects 
our research effort towards the factors that produce swings around this average, 
including differences in works council types and their workplace environments. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: In einem jüngst veröffentlichten Überblicksartikel kommt 
Frege (2002) zu dem Schluss, die ökonomische Analyse des Betriebsrats sei in 
eine Sackgasse geraten. Die vorliegende Arbeit zieht ein anderes Fazit, das auf 
einer umfassenderen Betrachtung der empirischen Evidenz beruht. Dabei werden 
drei Phasen der ökonomischen Analyse der betrieblichen Mitbestimmung 
unterschieden. Während Frege nur Studien aus den ersten beiden Phasen 
berücksichtigte, ist es gerade die dritte Forschungsphase, die einige der 
positivsten Bewertungen von Betriebsräten enthält. Selbst wenn derartige 
Einschätzungen stark übertrieben erscheinen und der Betriebsratseffekt im 
Durchschnitt relativ gering sein dürfte, weist die neuere Literatur darauf hin, dass 
unsere Forschungsbemühungen sich stärker auf Faktoren konzentrieren sollten, 
die Schwankungen um diesen Durchschnitt hervorrufen (wie z.B. unterschiedliche 
Typen von Betriebsräten und deren Arbeitsplatzumgebung). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Research into the impact of works councils on firm performance dates from the mid- to late-
1980s, with a series of articles by FitzRoy and Kraft (1985, 1987, 1990) that strongly rejected 
any positive general association between works councils and firm performance. Until then it 
had largely been taken for granted that what was good for workplace relations necessarily 
benefited firm performance. FitzRoy and Kraft’s altogether more pessimistic evaluation 
served to stimulate the economic analysis of works councils, even if progress was to be fitful 
because of data limitations.  
 
Almost from the outset, analysis of the likely economic consequences of works councils 
attracted considerable interest outside of Germany. This was primarily due to the points of 
contact between this work and two important strands of (Anglo-Saxon) industrial relations 
and labour economics research, namely, the literature concerning the economic 
consequences of unions on the one hand and that dealing with the performance effects of 
employee involvement on the other. These links were reinforced by Freeman and Medoff’s 
(1984) application to the labour market of Hirschman’s (1970) exit-voice paradigm (see also 
Addison and Belfield, 2003), as these authors’ ideas gradually took root. 
 
The survey article by Frege (2002) is indicative of the sustained interest in the institution of 
the Betriebsrat outside of Germany. In her review, Frege offers an assessment of research 
on works councils from the perspective of several disciplines. And in addressing the 
ontology, practice, and transformation of works councils, she usefully locates the economics 
component into wider research relief. Nonetheless, we contend that her summary of the 
labour economics research is seriously incomplete. In the first place, there are a number of 
factual errors in her treatment.
1 Second, she provides only a partial view of the developing 
                                            
1  First, Frege (2002, p. 236) incorrectly attributes the management pressure/competence argument (see 
below) to Addison, Kraft, and Wagner (1993) rather than to FitzRoy and Kraft (1985, 1987, 1990). Second, 
she argues that the study by Addison, Kraft, and Wagner (1993) does not have a sufficiently large control 
group of firms without works councils, gives no information on the size of firms in the sample, and indeed 
fails to indicate whether size is controlled for (Frege, 2002: 237). In fact, Addison, Kraft, and Wagner state 
that codetermination-free establishments make up 40 per cent of this particular sample, provide descriptive 
statistics on firm size (measured by employment) in an appendix table, and in each of their regressions 
provide the coefficient estimates for this size variable. Third, in addressing the findings of Addison, 
Schnabel, and Wagner (1997), Frege (2002: 237) is in fact referring to findings from Addison, Siebert, 
Wagner, and Wei (2000). We do not further address either of these studies here, other than to note that the 
former estimates a linear probability model of works council presence for Germany while the latter offers a 
cross-country test of the Freeman-Lazear (1995) model discussed by Frege (2002: 234-35).  4 
economic literature up to 2000, discussing just four of the mainstream economic studies, 
while citing eight.
 In contrast, our review of the earlier literature will discuss (cite) seventeen 
(twenty-two) empirical studies, as well as a wider range of performance outcomes. Third, in 
discussing this research she compounds two distinct phases of the literature, delineated by 
pronounced differences in sample size, findings, and methodology. Finally, she omits the 
very latest research based on the nationally representative Establishment Panel of the 
Institute for Labour Market Research (of the Federal Labour Office). Interestingly, this third 
phase of research contains some of the most optimistic evaluations of works council impact 
on firm performance. 
 
Ultimately, Frege (2002: 239) concludes that the economic analysis of the works council is at 
a ‘dead end’. In the light of the preceding criticisms, we think it necessary to offer both a 
restatement and update of the economic effects of the German works council. In this 
endeavour, the three phases of research that we identify provide an indispensable guide to 
the developing economic literature. Contrary to Frege, we will conclude that continued 
disputation in the literature is a sign of vitality rather than indicative of its having reached a 
dead end, although a new research agenda is now necessary. 
 
2. THE THREE PHASES OF ECONOMICS RESEARCH  
Research into the association between works councils and firm performance conforms to 
three distinct phases, defined by differences in the type of datasets investigated, explanatory 
variables used, and econometric methods deployed. The first phase is marked by the 
investigation of small samples of firms in cross section. The second phase largely 
corresponds to the analysis of much larger data sets of a regional or industry-specific nature 
(with one exception noted below). The third phase is characterised by the use of truly 
nationally representative data. The second and third phases are based on panel data, 
although it has proved difficult to fully exploit the longitudinal nature of the new datasets 
because very few plants introduce or abandon works councils over the life of the panel. Also, 
as we shall see, the findings of works council effect differ between and within phases. 
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PHASE I: SMALL SAMPLE STUDIES.  
Results of what we have termed the first phase of research are contained in Table 1. Apart 
from their being based on small samples of firms, the hallmark of these Phase I studies is 
the often unfavourable association between works council presence and the particular 
economic outcome investigated. This is most obviously the case in the key studies by 
FitzRoy and Kraft (rows 1 through 3), which are also notable for their technical sophistication 
(namely, use of systems of equations).  
 
(Table 1 near here) 
 
As can be seen from the table, FitzRoy and Kraft exploit a common data set to investigate 
three outcome indicators: profitability (row 1), total factor productivity (row 2), and innovation 
(row 3). The unifying theme of all three studies is a managerial pressure/managerial 
competence model. Hard-driving managers are said to elicit greater effort from their workers 
and are rewarded with higher salaries and profits. This pressure exerted by management 
causes workers to join unions, and unionised workers get higher wages even if this is only 
partial compensation for their greater effort. Workers are also more likely to form a works 
council to protect themselves from ‘adverse’ management actions, which will include the 
pressure on required levels of effort. Yet efficient managers, so the argument runs, can 
institute adequate systems of communication and decision-making without the impediment of 
autonomous works councils (i.e. works councils are viewed as a constraint, not a potential 
source of efficiency gain). Managerial competence is thus expressed in a reduced probability 
of works council presence, partly because efficient managers pay higher wages. 
 
In testing this managerial pressure/managerial competence model, FitzRoy and Kraft seek to 
explain and model the existence of workplace ‘representation’. In their profitability study (row 
1), the authors are concerned to explain the association between workplace union density 
and profitability, and in particular the line of causation running from performance to 
workplace density as workers react to the higher demands made of them by managers in a 
defensive fashion. In their productivity study (row 2), it is now works council presence that is 
simultaneously estimated with total factor productivity, with the expectation that causation 
will run in two directions: partly from higher performance to workplace representation (the 
defensive mechanism) as in the case of union membership/density, but also from works 
council presence to output as this form of workplace representation is held to adversely 
impact performance by limiting management prerogative. Finally, in their study of firm  6 
innovation (row 3), FitzRoy and Kraft argue that the impact of union density may be direct 
after all and serve to reinforce the negative effect of the works council; that is, a works 
council is supposed to carry more weight in negotiations where workplace union density is 
high and will be more likely to take a hard line in conflict situations. (In addition, FitzRoy and 
Kraft posit that a more highly unionised workforce is more likely to elect a council.) 
Accordingly, in this study they combine works council presence with union density to form an 
‘organised labour’ variable which is then jointly estimated with the level of innovative activity. 
 
What do FitzRoy and Kraft find from endogenising workplace representation in this manner? 
In their study of financial performance, works councils are associated with sharply reduced 
profitability (row 1). In this case, however, observe that works council presence is taken to be 
exogenous, so that it is only the nonrandom distribution of union density which is being is 
modeled. In their productivity analysis (row 2), works council presence leads to lower total 
factor productivity. That is to say, purged of any (positive) feedback effect from productivity 
to works council presence, works councils are associated with lower productivity.  
 
To repeat, in both these studies the effect of unions is positive but indirect. However, in the 
case of the row 3 study, the role of the union is direct and is argued to operate in tandem 
with works council presence to impede efficiency. FitzRoy and Kraft’s simultaneous equation 
estimates of innovation (as proxied by the proportion of sales consisting of new products 
introduced over a five-year interval) and the organized labour variable point to a strongly 
negative effect running from organization to innovation, and with no reverse causality 
operating. 
 
Most of the other studies of Phase I provide single-equation estimates. The major exception 
is the study by Kraft (1986) in row 7 (see below). Together they fail to tell as consistent a 
story of works council impact as do the analyses of FitzRoy and Kraft. But of all the studies 
only Schnabel and Wagner (1994) report a favourable impact of the works council (row 4). In 
an analysis of innovative activity, this time measured by R&D intensity, these authors find a 
marginally significant positive relation between works council presence and innovation 
among their sample of 31 establishments in a 1990 cross section. Any such favourable 
impact is sensitive to workplace union density. The tipping point here is 51 per cent 
unionization. Once this threshold is breached, the positive impact of the works council is 
reversed and the association becomes increasingly negative. 
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Only one of the Phase I studies looks at investment in physical capital. In an analysis of 
investment – as measured by the ratio of gross capital formation to the capital stock – for  a 
sample of a little over 50 manufacturing establishments in two German Länder in 1990/91, 
Addison, Kraft, and Wagner (1993) report that plants with works councils undertake 
significantly less investment than their codetermination-free counterparts (row 5). But if 
works council presence yields less favourable investment, this negative result does not 
apparently carry over to value added or to pretax profits also examined in the same study. 
 
Works council effects on a subjective measure(s) of profitability, as well as a measure of 
product innovation, are also found to be generally statistically insignificant in a study of 
industrial firms in Lower Saxony by Addison and Wagner (1997), based on a telephone 
interview of an initial sample of 175 establishments in 1993 (row 6 of the table). This study is 
notable for its being the first attempt to gauge the degree of influence of the works council. 
The authors derive an index of works council voice according to its reported involvement in 
four areas of decision making. A marginally significant negative association is found between 
the extent of works council voice and the achievement of high profitability, again as 
assessed by the manager respondent. By contrast, the coefficient estimates for a 
conventional works council measure are statistically significant throughout, whether works 
council presence is endogenised or not. 
 
The last study in row 7 of Table 1 is noteworthy for its attempt to inquire into the black box of 
mechanisms through which works councils are supposed to achieve the benefits attributed to 
them. Pooling two years of data on metalworking firms (i.e. the same sample as 
subsequently used by FitzRoy and Kraft in the studies summarized in rows 1 and 2 of Table 
1), Kraft (1986) regresses a dummy variable capturing low/high turnover among unskilled 
workers  – manager respondents to the study questionnaire were asked whether the quit 
rates of unskilled workers were ‘high’ or ‘low’ – on an index of individual voice, works council 
presence (i.e. collective voice), a measure of training opportunities, firm size, and variables 
capturing production techniques and organisation structure. The novel individual voice 
argument is constructed on the basis of replies to questions as to the decision possibilities 
open to blue-collar workers in the areas of investment and rationalization, coordination of 
work groups, and the determination of job design. Kraft finds that turnover is materially 
reduced, the greater the opportunities for the exercise of individual voice. The coefficient 
estimate for collective voice/works council presence is positive but not statistically significant, 
while all the other covariates are shown to have their expected effect on turnover. 
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One obvious cause for concern with the Phase I studies is the issue of sample size. The use 
of small samples should reduce the precision of the works council coefficient estimate and 
thus predispose any test against finding a works council effect. At the same time, problems 
of omitted variables bias are elevated by the limited number of control variables and cloud 
even ‘well-determined’ (i.e. statistically significant) associations in the data. In any event, we 
see that there is little overt support for the institution of the works council and some 
seemingly strong adverse effects. 
 
Another issue is the works council variable. As we have seen, the above studies typically 
recoup the works council effect from the coefficient estimate for a variable indicating actual 
or, less commonly, predicted works council presence. An immediate concern is that most 
establishments over a certain size have works councils, while most plants under a certain 
size do not. In 2000, for example, just 9.1 per cent of German establishments employing 
between 5 and 20 employees had works councils whereas in plants with between 201 and 
500 (over 500) employees the corresponding incidence was 80.6 (91.7) per cent. In other 
words, over certain ranges of employment one cannot hope to identify a works council effect 
using a measure based on presence of the entity alone. Therefore one should use samples 
containing a good number of establishments with and without works councils. In this regard, 
there is no obvious indication of ‘imbalance’ in the Phase I studies. Moreover, whatever the 
general disadvantage of small samples of firms from the perspective of statistical inference, 
also observe that some of the Phase I datasets have been rich enough to allow the 
researcher to fashion measures of the degree of involvement of the works council in 
decision-making (the row 6 study) or to examine the relationship between the works council 
and workplace union density (rows 3 and 4). As we shall see, the parsimony of larger data 
sets in this regard has required alternative solutions to works council ‘definition’, such as 
prior structuring by sample size (i.e. examining size ranges within which the power of the 
works council is a datum), as well as reformulation of the ‘collective bargaining’ variable.  
 
Finally, observe that not all performance outcomes have received equal treatment in Phase 
I. In particular, there is a seeming neglect of employment indicators. That being said, 
employment is a more ambiguous performance measure than outcomes such as productivity 
or investment. Take the case of employment change.   Reduced  employment  growth  might 
well indicate inferior performance. On the other hand, successful attempts to recast 
outmoded workplace organization into a form more adaptable to technical change, or the 
abandonment of restrictive work practices, might also be reflected in slowed employment 
growth. In any event, just one of the Phase I studies examines employment (row 7) and is  9 
unconventional in focusing on a subjective  measure of quits rather than an objective, 
continuous measure of turnover. However, the use of a subjective indicator can be 
informative. For example, objective data may not be available for individual skill categories. 
More important, absent formalisation of what constitutes an optimal quit rate, a manager’s 
identification of ‘excessive’ quits – or lack thereof – might usefully supplement objective data; 
in particular, indications of higher quit rates in plants without works councils may have no 
implications for efficiency when subjective data fail to identify turnover as problematic or 
‘high’. 
 
Despite some real data strengths – including information on establishment variables – the 
fact remains that the findings of the early research literature may not be representative by 
reason of sample size, and sector and region covered. As a result, the associations revealed 
in Phase I studies cannot be generalised beyond the samples investigated, and do not offer 
a solid basis for making inferences about the efficacy of works councils for the firm or the 
economy.  
 
PHASE II: SOME NEW LARGE-SCALE DATA SETS  
Studies of the next phase are able to exploit large-scale data sets, principally the Hannover 
Firm Panel and the NIFA-Panel. The population of the first data set is all manufacturing 
establishments with at least five employees in the state of Lower Saxony. The actual sample 
of plants is stratified according to firm size and industry. It comprises around 1,000 
establishments in 1994, declining to a little over 700 establishments by the time of the fourth 
wave in 1997 because of sample attrition (for a description of this data set, see Brand, 
Carstensen, Gerlach, and Klodt, 1996; Gerlach, Hübler, and Meyer, 2003). The second 
survey is of all establishments in the German machine-tool industry and covers the period 
1989-1999. This panel has eight waves, the data for which were collected via a mail 
questionnaire. The sample base is approximately 6,000 companies, and the realised sample 
approximates 1,500 per wave (see Schmidt and Widmaier, 1992; Widmaier, 2001). 
 
There is also a third data set in the form of a nationally representative but older and 
employment-based survey of 2,392 private-sector firms, conducted in 1987 (see 
Büchtemann and Höland, 1989). Reflecting its narrower focus on employment issues, use of 
this data set has been restricted to the analysis of labour fluctuations. 
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A summary of results from selected Phase II studies is provided in Table 2. The overall 
picture is that works councils now appear in rather more favourable light. The jury is still out 
today on whether this difference reflects the unrepresentativeness of the Phase I studies, or 
is instead a practical manifestation of the improvement in, or maturation of, the relationship 
between firms and their works councils flagged in the German industrial relations literature 
(in particular, see Kotthoff, 1994). 
 
Four distinguishing characteristics of the Phase II studies can usefully be identified. First, 
there is a tendency to look for differences in works council impact by establishment size. 
There are several reasons for this. One is the point made earlier that very large plants 
almost always have works councils and small plants seldom do. Another reason is that 
works council authority (number of councilors, number of paid councilors, entitlements to 
information, and input in matters of personnel selection, etc.) is as a matter of law increasing 
in establishment size. When a dummy variable indicating the presence or otherwise of a 
works council at the establishment is used in a regression model, that variable can only be 
expected to pick up the effect of a works council if two conditions are met: first, 
establishments with and without works councils need to be present in reasonable numbers; 
second, the rights of the works council must be the same in all establishments. If only a tiny 
number of firms in a sample have (do not have) a council, we cannot expect to be able to 
estimate the effect of the entity with any precision. And if the legal rights of a council are not 
held constant over the establishments in the sample, a simple dummy variable cannot, as a 
matter of construction, take care of this variation and any related variation in the economic 
impact of works councils in firms of different size. Therefore, some of the Phase II studies 
seek ab initio to estimate the association between works councils and various performance 
outcomes by looking at firms with between 21 and 100 employees, within which employment 
range the legal rights of the works council are a datum and the number of plants with and 
without a council is roughly equal. A separate and more general size-related issue is that 
there are practical grounds for believing that the costs of the codetermination apparatus may 
be greater and the benefits smaller for specific categories of plant. In this latter context, 
using data from the first wave of the Hannover Firm Panel, Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 
(2001), caution that where beneficial outcomes are observed these tend to be confined to 
establishments with more than 100 employees (row 2 of Table 2). 
 
(Table 2 near here) 
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Second, more attention is paid in the Phase II literature to labour turnover. Here the findings 
are seemingly at odds with the evidence from the single Phase I turnover study reviewed 
earlier. In her review, Frege (2002: 237-38) chooses to emphasise the turnover issue, 
focusing on a Phase II study by Backes-Gellner, Frick, and Sadowski (1997) that uses data 
from the Büchtemann and Höland (1989) data set. Backes-Gellner et al. argue that skills 
formation and acquisition are a precondition for the success of the German model and that 
the works council promotes reliance investments (termed effective skill utilisation) by 
fostering cooperation between the two sides and safeguarding employment security. Their 
evidence is indirect, however, reflecting the lack of data on training in this data set. That is to 
say, rather than examining training investments directly, these authors mainly look to 
evidence on quit rates and dismissals, both of which are found to be materially reduced in 
the presence of works councils. Since the facts on these associations were first reported by 
Frick and Sadowski (1995), the details given in row 1 of Table 2 pertain to this study. 
 
Although data from the much richer Hannover Firm Panel do not always point to reduced 
quits in works council regimes – while also indicating that management in works council 
plants is more prone to complain that employment levels are excessive – they do 
nonetheless tell much the same employment story. Thus, for example, Addison, Schnabel, 
and Wagner (2001) find that hires, quits, and dismissals are all reduced in works council 
settings (row 2). The same tendency is evident in Dilger’s (2002) analysis of personnel 
fluctuation using the NIFA Panel (row 6). 
 
Since lower quit rates increase the time horizon over which training investments may be 
recouped they imply greater training, so that Frege is quite correct to rehearse the training 
argument. Indeed, in a recent study using the Hannover Firm Panel not summarised in Table 
2, Gerlach and Jirjahn (2001) report that works council establishments provide more further 
training than their codetermination-free counterparts. But real progress in identifying the work 
council role in this area optimally requires matched employee and employer data. Such 
information would assist in identifying the effect of works councils on quit rates over and 
above the contribution of wages. Also, to recall our earlier observation that the reduction in 
quits/increase in training investments under works councils might be excessive, it would also 
be useful as a first step to include either quits or training intensity in production function test. 
Pending such analyses, the role of this key collective voice route to improved performance 
remains opaque. 
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Third, a rather interesting development in this stage of the developing literature is the 
inclusion of a collective bargaining variable proper. Unlike their Phase I precursors, the 
large-scale data sets of Phase II either fail to contain information on union density or that 
information is unreliable. The new studies instead use the presence or otherwise of a 
collective bargaining agreement at regional or industry level, namely, a ‘union coverage’ 
variable that reflects the dual system of industrial relations in Germany. In its fullest 
application, the new variable is interacted with works council presence, so that works council 
impact (inter al.) is examined separately by collective bargaining regime. In particular, the 
study by Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) in row 3 of the table offers a formal test of Freeman and 
Lazear’s (1995) argument that where a works council is embedded in an external collective 
bargaining framework this will serve to dissipate distributional squabbles at the workplace, 
thereby enhancing any pro-productive effect of the works council. Hübler and Jirjahn test the 
model using pooled data from two waves of the Hannover Firm Panel. Both works council 
presence and collective bargaining coverage are treated as endogenous and modeled in 
separate productivity and wage equations. The productivity results in particular offer support 
for the model: labour productivity is higher in works council regimes but only where the 
establishment is covered by a collective agreement. The wage results are less compelling. 
That is to say, the idea that collective agreements can police rent-seeking behavior is 




The notion that strong collective bargaining can be beneficial is also encountered in Britain, 
where it has been argued that unions need to be strong if they are to be effective agents of 
collective voice (see Bryson, 2001). In the German case, as we have seen, the argument is 
particularly interesting because of the intriguing prospect of a decoupling of distribution from 
production issues, even if only partial. Since this application seems to hinge on bargaining 
external to the firm, a real issue is raised by the growing tendency towards company-level 
collective agreements. The number of German firms bargaining at the company-level has 
tripled since 1990. We are unaware of any analysis of this development on performance 
outcomes, but as part of a future research agenda it would certainly be interesting to see – in 
the manner of the Phase I literature – whether the effects on workplace economic 
                                            
2  An earlier version of this paper also inquired into the works council-profitability nexus. Anomalously, the 
authors reported a positive albeit statistically insignificant association between their profit measure and 
works council presence irrespective of collective bargaining regime.  13 
performance are differentiated when both the union and the works council are active at the 
company level. 
 
The fourth  theme of the Phase II literature is the inclusion of employee involvement 
mechanisms and so-called ‘high performance work practices’. As can be seen from the entry 
in row 5 of Table 2, the latter include elements of the former such as teamwork. In one 
sense, research on the role of such personnel practices provides a link between Phase I and 
Phase II studies. In particular, in a follow-up of their earlier study (see row 2 of Table 1), 
FitzRoy and Kraft (1995) qualify their harsh interpretation of works council impact on 
establishment performance. They report evidence of a well-determined positive association 
between works councils and productivity in profit sharing regimes. Among firms that do not 
practice profit sharing, however, the works council effect on productivity is still negative and 
statistically significant. 
 
The main Phase II studies covering employee involvement/high performance work practices 
are reported in rows 5 and 6 of Table 2. But we should preface our review of this material 
with some remarks on the study in row 4 of the table that focuses on the interaction between 
works councils and profit-sharing schemes for managers. In his analysis of data from the 
Hannover Firm Panel, Jirjahn (2002) finds that works councils are generally associated with 
higher labour productivity and that this effect is strengthened after allowing for management 
incentive schemes which are themselves pro-productive. However, as can be seen from the 
table, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is negative, which the author interprets 
as consistent with two hypotheses: either profit-sharing management reduces the 
commitment value of agency in circumstances where the works council cannot foster trust 
and loyalty absent the cooperation of management, or management rent seeking is curbed 
by profit sharing and the works council is not so important for building cooperation in 
situations of reduced opportunism on the part of management. Although ultimately 
empirically inconclusive, conceptually this study represents a further development of the 
underlying collective voice model in which improvements in firm performance are potential 
rather than guaranteed (see Addison and Belfield, 2003). 
 
The last two studies in Table 2 return us to the issue of non-executive employee involvement 
mechanisms/high performance workplace practices. Each exploits the NIFA-Panel for the 
machine-tools industry. This data set is of interest for three main reasons. First, it identifies a 
set of five such practices. Second, it contains management’s assessment of the working 
relationship with the works council, albeit only for the sixth wave in 1996. Specifically, the  14 
NIFA survey asks the management respondent to rate the works council entity as (a) ‘mostly 
antagonistic’, (b) ‘sometimes difficult’, (c) ‘unreservedly cooperative’, (d) ‘passive’, and (e) 
‘excluded by management’. Third, the data set also records additional information on the 
degree of involvement of the works council. It can be seen from the table that the results of 
using this additional material are mixed. Thus, from the row 5 study it is the case that firms 
with works councils tend to use more high performance workplace practices than their works 
council-free counterparts but that the number of such practices is highest where the 
institution is described by management as ‘antagonistic’. More positively, from the more 
extensive study in the last row of the table, it can be seen that although the general tendency 
is for works council plants to record lower profitability this effect can apparently be negated 
by greater works council involvement. In addition, some beneficial effect of the works council 
on product innovation is detected in circumstances where its degree of involvement is above 
normal. 
 
Even if they contain few if any technical innovations, the studies of Phase II are noteworthy 
for their creative use of both existing and new variables such as establishment size, 
collective bargaining, and employee involvement. The use of these variables in performance 
equations has revealed the works council in more favourable light than the Phase I studies. 
As cases in point, recall the findings that works councils may be associated with higher 
productivity in larger plants; that the dual industrial relations system may allow the pro-
productive potential of works councils to be realised; and that works council effects may be 
positive when taken in conjunction with other forms of employee involvement. To be sure, 
there remain a number of inconsistencies and ambiguities in the literature. One example is 
provided by establishment profitability. Nearly all studies point to poorer financial 
performance in works council regimes, but what is the source of this deficit if – as is 
seemingly the case – (higher) wages and (lower) productivity do not emerge as consistent 
culprits? Another is the issue of whether employee involvement and other workplace 
practices complement or substitute for works councils. The literature tilts towards acceptance 
of complementarity, but this issue is also not settled.
3 
 
Almost all the research summarised in Table 2 is cross sectional. Problems of statistical 
inference may arise if the determinants of the key independent variable – works council 
                                            
3  It was an alleged shortfall of worker representation on the basis of statistics on works council incidence and 
coverage that prompted the recent reform of the Works Constitution Act; see Addison, Bellmann, Schnabel, 
and Wagner (2002).  15 
presence (or type, or intensity) – are not accounted for. For example, works councils may be 
introduced in circumstances of economic difficulty or advantage. Also, their introduction may 
reflect unobserved differences in the costs and benefits of the institution at plant level which 
may in turn be linked to the outcomes in which we are interested. As in the Phase I literature, 
there have been some attempts to endogenise works councils presence, although 
identification is particularly difficult in this case. Further, if some permanent unobserved plant 
characteristic is associated with works council presence (inter al.) and the outcome indicator, 
accounting for the nonrandom distribution of the works council in cross section will not 
suffice. In short, biases may attach to these Phase II estimates, and causality continues to 
be an issue. A final question is whether the above findings are representative given the 
regional and industrial composition of the two main data sets – or still representative given 
their vintage. This is the issue of external validity. Fortunately, in each of the above respects 
this is not the end of the story, as economists have most recently been able to use an 
unambiguously nationally representative data set with greater longitudinal capacity. 
 
PHASE III: THE IAB ESTABLISHMENT PANEL 
The latest data set to be used by researchers is the Establishment Panel of the Institute for 
Labour Market Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung/IAB) of the Federal 
Labour Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit). Beginning in 1993 the IAB Establishment Panel 
surveyed several thousand establishments from all sectors of the economy in the former 
West Germany and, since 1996, for the unified Germany. The Establishment Panel is based 
on a stratified random sample – the strata are for 16 industries and 10 employment size 
classes – from the population of all establishments with at least one employee covered by 
social insurance. To correct for panel mortality, exits and newly-founded units, the data are 
augmented regularly. Familiarly, the data are collected in personal interviews with the 
owners or senior management of the establishment. The purpose of the panel is to serve the 
needs of the Federal Labour Office, and so its focus is employment-related matters such as 
labour turnover, level and composition of employment, apprenticeship training, investments, 
and subsidies (see Kölling, 2000). 
 
Although information on most variables is collected for each wave of the panel, the works 
council question was asked of all establishments only in 1993, 1996, 1998, and 2000, and in 
the ‘missing’ years only of panel accessions. A few other questions have been asked on a 
less regular basis. Examples include questions on employee share ownership and profit  16 
sharing, teamworking, devolved decision-making, as well as additional information on 
training and the goals of training programmes (all of which arguments have variously been 
used to identify employee involvement /high performance work practices). 
 
(Table 3 near here) 
 
Table 3 provides a snapshot of some of the most recent research using the Establishment 
Panel. The information in the first two rows of the table indicates a strongly positive general 
association between works council presence and economic performance. This is particularly 
true of the studies by Frick (2002a, 2002b), summarised in row 1 of the table. Prior to Frick’s 
estimates, there were just two formal production function studies for Germany, namely, the 
Phase I studies by FitzRoy and Kraft (1987) and Addison, Kraft and Wagner (1993) – see 
rows 2 and 5 of Table 1, respectively – and none for a large data base. Frick uses the 
question in the Establishment Panel asking for information on ‘replacement investment’ (i.e. 
depreciation) as a rough proxy for the value of the capital stock. He estimates production 
functions for two cross sections of data (1998 and 2000), and reports that labour productivity 
is as much as 25 to 30 per cent higher in works council regimes. 
 
The production function study by Wolf and Zwick (2002) in row 2 of Table 3 also offers a very 
positive view of works council impact. Thus, for the 1999 cross section of the Establishment 
Panel, the authors obtain positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates for the 
works council dummy variable, albeit of somewhat smaller magnitude than reported by Frick. 
However, Wolf and Zwick are more concerned with the consequences of high performance 
workplace practices for output than with the effects of codetermination on performance. The 
authors identify two bundles of workplace practices, namely, ‘organisational changes’, 
comprising the delegation of responsibility and decisions to lower levels of the hierarchy, 
teamwork, and workgroups with an independent budget, and ‘incentives’ which include 
employee share ownership and profit sharing. 
 
Wolf and Zwick are especially concerned with the methodological problems that arise from 
the endogeneity of the decision to introduce these practices and from unobserved 
establishment characteristics. In recognition of these potential selection biases, Wolf and 
Zwick use a two-step panel estimation procedure, after Black and Lynch (2001). In the first 
step, a Cobb-Douglas production function is estimated for 1996-99 to calculate an 
unobserved time invariant fixed effect for each establishment in the sample, where the 
equation includes just the time-varying input factors as regressors. In the second step, these  17 
fixed effects are regressed on the high performance workplace practices and other (nearly) 
time-invariant determinants including the presence or otherwise of a works council, with and 
without controlling for the endogeneity of the workplace practices.
 For its part, the coefficient 
estimate for the works council dummy variable is reported to be strongly positive and 
statistically significant.
4 But this result is based on a cross-section test, and to the extent that 
the fixed component of the unobserved heterogeneity in the second stage is correlated with 
the observed firm-level characteristics, the finding of a positive works council effect may 
have no causal interpretation. 
 
In contrast to the above, each of the two other Phase III studies summarised in Table 3 
suggests that establishments with and without a works council do not exhibit statistically 
significant differences in efficiency. In the row 3 study, Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner 
(2002) estimate a fixed effects frontier production function separately for each of the two 
workplace regimes and then compare technical efficiencies of median plants in the two 
regimes. Only plants with between 21 and 100 employees (throughout the 1993-2000 
sample period) are included on the grounds that over this size interval the powers of the 
works council are a datum and to avoid any potential bias in the estimated impact of a works 
council due to size effects, reflecting the point that very large plants almost always have a 
works council whereas small plants seldom do. The confidence intervals of the reported 
technical efficiency estimates for the two types of plants overlap, leading the authors to 
conclude that there is no evidence that works council plants are any more efficient than their 
works council-free counterparts. 
 
In the row 4 study, Addison, Bellmann, Schnabel, and Wagner (2002) formally exploit 
changes in works council status through time. Since this study focuses on recent changes in 
the law facilitating works council formation – namely, the 2001 Works Constitution Reform 
Act – its concern is with the introduction of works councils rather than with their introduction 
and dissolution. The authors’ empirical strategy reflects their concern with the selection 
problem. They use a formal matching model to compare establishments that subsequently 
experienced the election of a works council with their closest counterparts from among the 
                                            
4   Interestingly, the effects on productivity of the two sets of high performance workplace practices identified in 
the study are reversed once unobserved plant heterogeneity and selection are accounted for. Specifically, 
those practices fostering employee involvement (e.g. teamworking) now have a significantly positive impact 
on productivity whereas the incentive bundles (e.g. profit sharing) turn statistically insignificant. The former 
measures appear to be introduced when firms confront structural problems, whereas the latter emerge as 
more a feature of good times.  18 
firmament of (1,513) plants that remained continuously free of works councils over the 
sample period. Unlike the other studies in Table 3 that focus exclusively on productivity, this 
study also considers changes in the quit rate, in employment, and in the profit situation 
between 1996 and 2000. Note that the change in productivity is proxied by the change in 
sales per employee rather than the more familiar value added per head measures as the 
Establishment Panel set has an unusually large number of missing values for purchases of 
intermediate products – a crucially important consideration given the small number of plants 
with new councils – although the two measures are highly correlated over the sample period. 
No statistically significant differences between the treatment group and the controls are 
reported for any of the four performance outcomes. In short, the establishment of a work 
council does not appear to have a causal effect on mainstream economic performance 
outcomes. 
 
Two other studies take their cue from the above analyses, and are referred to but not 
summarized in the table. Thus, Zwick (2003) re-examines one of the two bundles of high 
performance workplace practices identified in Wolf and Zwick (2002) – namely, 
‘organizational changes’ – and investigates whether its effects on establishment productivity 
differ as between plants with and without works councils since he finds that the production 
functions differ in the two settings. In addition to modeling the endogeneity of this bundle of 
workplace practices, as in the row 2 study, he also allows for the endogeneity of works 
council presence using an endogenous switching regression model. Zwick reports that the 
pro-productive effects of such organizational changes are confined to workplaces with works 
councils. His estimates of the independent influence of works councils on productivity closely 
correspond to those reported in the row 2 study. 
 
A final exercise by Addison, Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner (2003) provides a sensitivity 
analysis of the works council effect in production function estimates. It is shown that the 
large positive coefficient estimates for the works council variable reported in some of the 
literature are not only sensitive to sector and region (as suggested in the row 1 studies) but 
also and especially to establishment size. In establishments with 21-100 employees – where, 
to repeat, works council powers are a datum and where there is a balanced representation of 
both types of workplace regime – the coefficient estimates for the works council dummy 
plummet and are typically statistically insignificant. The suggestion that there are likely to be 
few cet. par. differences on average between plants with works councils and plants without 
them is consistent with the findings of the studies in rows 3 and 4 of Table 3. 
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In outlining some key Phase III results, we have evidently traveled a long way from our 
starting point. The Phase I literature pointed to some really rather alarming adverse 
consequences of works council presence. Phase II studies for their part, while by no means 
uniformly supportive of works councils, nonetheless identify a number of circumstances in 
which beneficial net works council effects might obtain. And, initially at least, the Phase III 
research using nationally representative data seemed unreservedly favourable to works 
councils. Although we have argued that the latter estimates are inflated and that the effects 
of works councils on productivity are likely to be small on average, even this attenuated 
conclusion is of course a far cry from the tenor of Phases I studies. 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
In this restatement and update of a burgeoning body of empirical research into the economic 
consequences of works councils, we have characterised the developments as conforming to 
three distinct stages. Although the empirical findings are not tidy, it would be a mistake to 
conclude that research into the economic consequences of works councils has stalled or 
otherwise reached a dead end. The following itemisation might help clarify what we have 
learned and what we need to know more about. First, it would appear to be the case that the 
early literature either encouraged an overly negative view of the impact of works councils on 
net, or that the functioning of works councils has improved since then. Second, from the 
subsequent literature, the average works council ‘effect’ would appear to obscure some 
systematic differences by establishment size, collective bargaining coverage, and employee 
involvement mechanism. Thus, even if smaller establishments may be hampered by, say, 
slowed decision making under works councils it might also be true that large plants would 
have had to invent something akin to the entity in the absence of their being mandated under 
law. For its part, collective bargaining coverage may assist in decoupling distribution from 
production issues, and help focus the works council on the latter. And some forms of 
employee involvement/high performance workplace practices may be highly productive in 
works council regimes. Third, excessive admiration of the institution is as misplaced as 
excessive revulsion towards it. Some of the latest, Phase III estimates of the effect of works 
councils on labour productivity are likely to seduce. But we have argued that they need to be 
taken with more than a pinch of statistical salt, and have countered with evidence suggesting 
that the works council effect may be zero on average. 
  20 
Enough has been said to indicate that we do not intend this attenuated but important 
conclusion to be read as establishing a (German) case for works councils, although we 
recognize that those who have always viewed the economic case for works councils as 
secondary to the requirements of equity (i.e. industrial democracy) may well regard it as 
decisive. Rather, our conclusion would be that research should now focus on the factors that 
produce shifts around this average relation. 
 
As a next step, research into the effects of works councils should perhaps concentrate on 
firms with newly established councils, with a view to determining why they were introduced 
and identifying their effects on firm performance. Here a matching approach comparing 
quasi-identical firms with and without a new council might usefully be applied. This 
procedure can be accomplished with longitudinal data sets such as the IAB Establishment 
Panel used in the Phase III studies, provided the number of plants in which a works council 
is introduced is large enough. In this latter context, recent changes in the Works Constitution 
Act may be helpful in that they portend an increase in the formation of new works councils. A 
more ambitious and necessarily longer-term research goal would require that we go beyond 
‘the dummy variable approach’ and use in-depth case studies to examine different types of 
works councils operating in different environments. Ideally, these case studies should be 
informed by the first procedure, that is, seek to compare firms in which works councils were 
elected with otherwise identical firms in which they were not. 
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 Table 1:  The Economic Impact of the Works Council – Phase I Studies 
Study Data  Dependent  variable(s)  Methodology  Findings 




Pooled data for 
1977 and 1979 on 
61/62 firms in the 
metal-working 
industry. 
Profitability, union density, wages, and 
salaries. 
Four-equation system 
estimated by 3SLS. Detailed 
firm controls. Work council 
presence not endogenised. 
Union density has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on 
profitability (and on wages and 
salaries). Coefficient estimate for 
works council dummy is negative and 
statistically significant in the profit 
equation. 




As above.  Total factor productivity and works 
council presence. 
Two-equation system.   Work council presence associated 
with a significant reduction in 
productivity. Union density effects 
positive and statistically significant 
throughout.  






Innovation , as proxied by the 
proportion of sales consisting of new 
products introduced in the preceding 
five years, and an ‘organised labour’ 
measure derived from the interaction of 
the works council dummy and union 
density.    
Two-equation system.   Organised labour covariate is 
associated with a statistically 
significant reduction in innovative 
activity. 







two German states, 
1990. 
Proportion of revenues spent on R&D in 
1979.  
Single-equation Tobit model. 
Parsimonious specification. 
Coefficient estimate for works council 
dummy is positive and marginally 
statistically significant. Union density 
has strongly negative effect on R&D 
intensity. 





c. 50 establishment 
sample from same 
data as in row 4 
study above. 
Profitability, value added, and 
investment. 
Single-equation 
specifications estimated by 
least median of 
squares/reweighted least 
squares.  
Mixed pattern of generally statistically 
insignificant coefficient estimates for 
the works council dummy variable. But 
the works council effect is negative 
and statistically significant in the case 
of investment in physical capital.  





one German state, 
1993. 
Subjective measure of ‘high profitability” 
and an innovation measure 
(introduction of a new product in 1992).  
Probit models. Three works 
council indicators: works 
council presence, degree of 
participation or voice of the 
works council, and an 
instrument for the presence 
of a works council. 
Mixed pattern of generally statistically 
insignificant coefficient estimates for 
all three works council variables. The 
exception is the degree of works 
council involvement measure which is 
negatively associated with high 
profitability, albeit only at the 10% 
level.   
7. Kraft (1986)  As for the studies in 
rows 1 and 2. 
Subjective measure of ‘high quits’ and a 
synthetic measure of ‘individual voice’, 
in each case for unskilled workers.  
Simultaneous system of 
probit equations.  
Individual voice, but not collective 
voice (as proxied by works council 
presence), serves to significantly 
reduce high turnover.   
Table 2:  The Economic Impact of the Works Council – Phase II Studies 






1,616 firms taken from a 
nationally representative 
survey of 2,392 for- profit 
enterprises in the 
manufacturing and 
service sectors.  Data 
cover the interval May 
1985-April 1987. 
Quit and dismissal rates.  Single-equation log-odds model 
estimated by OLS.  
Works council presence associated with statistically 
significant reductions in quits and dismissals (2.4 








c. 900 establishments 
from the 1994 wave of 
the Hannover Firm Panel 
(see text). Detailed 
establishment and 
industry controls. 
Value-added per worker; 
subjective measure(s) of 
financial performance; 
wages and salaries per 
employee (and the 
percentage ‘wage gap’); 
three labour turnover 
measures (hires, 
separations, and gross 
turnover); and two measures 
of innovation (introduction of 
new processes/products). 
Single-equation estimates. 
Separate results for all 
establishments and a subset of 
plants with 21-100 employees 
Works council presence associated with higher 
labour productivity overall, but not for establish-
ments with 21-100 employees. Profitability 
systematically lower in the presence of works 
councils.  Wages are higher when there are works 
councils but the sources of these higher earnings 
are not transparent.  All labour turnover measures 
are reduced in the presence of works councils other 
than for the subset of smaller establishments. 
Neither process nor product innovation is materially 




Pooled data from the 
1994 and 1996 waves of 
the Hannover Firm Panel 
(see text). Detailed 
establishment and 
industry controls, 
including whether or not 
the plant is covered by an 
(external) collective 
agreement. 
Value added per worker, and 
wages and salaries per 
employee. 
Bivariate probit maximum 
likelihood estimates of works 
council presence and coverage by 
a collective agreement to form 
selection arguments in the 
outcome equations 
Positive effect of works council on productivity 
measure is statistically significant only where the 
plant is covered by a collective agreement. But 
wages are higher in works council regimes 
irrespective of collective agreement coverage. 
4. Jirjahn 
(2002) 
As above. Detailed 
establishment and 
industry controls, 
including whether or not 
plant management 
covered by a profit 
sharing arrangement.  
Value added per employee.  Single-equation OLS model 
(auxiliary probit model of works 
council presence provided, but not 
used to provide selectivity-
adjusted estimates). Separate 
estimates for all establishments 
and a subset of plants with 21-100 
employees. 
Across all establishments and the subset of smaller 
plants, the effect of works council presence is 
positive and statistically significant (in all but one 
specification). Executive profit sharing schemes are 
also pro-productive throughout, although the 
interaction effect is negative and significant for the 
all-establishment case   
5. Frick 
(2001) 
c. 1,700 establishments 
from the 6th (1996) wave 
of the NIFA-Panel.  This 
data set identifies five 
high performance work 
practices (HPWP). It also 
distinguishes five types of 
works council as 
assessed by 
management (ranging 
from ‘antagonistic’ to 
‘excluded’) and a variable 
identifying greater 
involvement of the works 
council in processes of 
technological and/or 
organizational change 
than laid down under the 
law or collective 
agreements.  
Number of HPWP practices.  Descriptive analysis: gives 
number of HPWP used in plants 
by works council presence, 
involvement, and type. The five 
HPWP are reductions in 
hierarchies, delegation of 
decision-making, work groups with 
independent budgets, group- or 
team-work, and flexible working 
time. 
Multiple classification analysis:  
uses same categories as for 
descriptive treatment and five 
covariates (viz. log number of 
employees, log sales per 
employee, stock of orders, and 
the degrees of capacity and 
manpower utilisation).  
Establishments with works councils use more 
HPWP than plants without works councils, although 
this difference is not statistically significant in the 
multivariate analysis.  Establishments with works 
council involvement in technological and 
organisational change exceeding that set down by 
law or collective agreement also have more HPWP 
than do plants with less involved councils. But the 
number of HPWP is highest in establishments 
where the works council is rated ‘antagonistic’. 
HPWP are reported to have a positive effect on 
establishment performance but a negative influence 








NIFA-Panel, as above, 
but supplemented with 
information on works 
council presence from 
the 4th (1994) wave. 
Three works council 
measures identified: a 
simple dummy variable 
indicating presence or 
otherwise of the entity, a 
set of dummy variables 
for the various types of 
works councils (see row 
5 above), and the change 




Quit, hire, and labour 
fluctuation rates; flexible 
working time; product 
innovation; and financial 
performance (a dummy 
variable indicating the 
achievement of at least a 
‘sufficient’ rate of return). 
Single-equation cross-section 
OLS regressions for quit, hire, and 
labour fluctuation rates. Single 
equation, cross-section Logit 
models for flexible working time, 
product innovation, and financial 
performance.  Models for flexible 
working time, product innovation, 
and profitability are also estimated 
separately for plants with 21-100 
employees. Multinomial Logit 
models for the determinants of 
flexible working time use the three 
works council measures and 
detailed plant-level controls. 
Works councils consistently reduce all measures of 
personnel fluctuation, but the coefficient estimates 
for some types of works councils are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Works councils 
promote the use of flexible working time (in both the 
all-establishment sample and the subset of plants 
with 21-100 employees), but the effects by type of 
council are not always well determined. Although 
works councils do not in general influence product 
innovation, where their involvement in technological 
and organisational changes exceeds that laid down 
by law or collective agreement the effect is positive 
and weakly statistically significant.  The impact of 
works councils on financial performance is negative 
for all establishments and smaller establishments, 
but is not statistically significant where the degree of 
engagement of the council in technological 
/organisational change exceeds benchmark levels. 
Notes: 
a See also Backes-Gellner, Frick, and Sadowski (1997); Frick (1997); and Gerlach and Jirjahn (2001). 
 
b See also Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner (1996, 1998); Addison, Siebert, Wagner, and Wei (2001).  
Table 3:  The Economic Impact of the Works Council – Phase III Studies
a 





Panel, using data on 
2,640 western German 
and 2,119 eastern 
German 
establishments. 
Log value added.  A works-council-in-the-production-function 
test (Cobb-Douglas, CES, and translog 
specifications). Separate results given for 
eastern and western Germany in two cross 
sections (1998 and 2000).  Establishment 
controls include capital, as proxied by 
replacement investment.  
Works council presence is associated with 
sharply higher labour productivity of 25% 
(30%) for western (eastern) Germany. 
Disaggregations by broad sector (i.e. 
manufacturing and services) confirm this 
basic result for eastern Germany, and for 
services (although not manufacturing) in 
western Germany. 





As above, 1999 and 
1996-99. Gross sample 
contains 6,397 
establishments. 
Log value added.  Production function test. Main focus of study 
is on the output effects of (six) high 
performance workplace practices (HPWP) 
rather than codetermination per se. Cross 
section estimates – with and without 
correction for selection into (grouped) HPWP 
arrangement – are provided for the 1999 
wave.  Panel estimates, again controlling for 
the endogeneity of the broad HPWP 
arrangement, follow a two-stage procedure, 
and use data from the 1996-99 waves. 
Detailed plant controls.  
The coefficient estimate for works council 
presence is positive and highly statistically 
significant in the basic cross-section model. 
But the point estimate is not robust with 
correction for selection on the personnel 
measures in one specification. In the panel 
estimates, works council presence has a 
strongly positive impact on the 
establishment-specific fixed effect.  









As above, 1993-2000. 
Unbalanced (n=2,301) 
and balanced (n=592) 
sample of west German 
establishments with 21-
100 employees. 
Log total sales.   Fixed effects estimation of a stochastic 
frontier production function.  The comparison 
is between the technical efficiency estimates 
– and their 95% confidence intervals – of the 
median works council plant and its works 
council free counterpart. 
There are no statistically significant 
differences in efficiency between 
establishments with and without work 







As above, 1996-2000. 
Initial sample of 1,544 
establishments, all 
without works councils 
in 1996. 




Nonparametric propensity score matching 
model. ‘Treated’ group comprises all plants 
in which a works council was set up between 
1996 and 1998. Matched plants derived from 
the 1,513 controls. 
Mean values for the performance indicators 
in establishments that introduced works 
councils are not statistically different from 
those of comparator plants that remained 
works council free. Results are robust to 
outliers.  
Notes: 
a See also  Addison, Bellmann, and Kölling (2002).  
b See also Zwick (2003).  
c See also Addison, Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner (2003).  
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